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Abstract
Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious.
Polarized views, controversy, and overt conflict have become pervasive. Risk
perception research has recently begun to provide a new perspective on this
problem. Distrust in risk analysis and risk management plays a central role in
this perspective. According to this view, the conflicts and controversies
surrounding risk management are not due to public ignorance orirrationality
but, instead, are seen as a side effect ofourremarkable form of participatory
democracy, amplified by powerful technological and social changes that
systematically destroy trust. Recognizing the importance oftrust and
understanding the "dynamics of the system" that destroys trust has vast
implications for how we approach risk management inthe future.
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Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy '
My objective in thispaperis to examine the interplay between several
remarkable trends within our society pertaining to the perception and
management of risk.
The first of these trends is the fact that during a twenty-year period
during which our society hasgrown healthier and safer on average andspent
billions of dollars and immense effort to become so, the American public has
become more—rather than less—concerned about risk. We have come to
perceive ourselves as increasingly vulnerable to life's hazards and tobelieve
that our land, air, and waterare more contaminated by toxic substances than
ever before.
A second dramatic trend that I believe is closely related to the first is the
fact that risk assessment and risk management—like manyother facets of our
society—have become much more contentious. Polarized views, controversy
and overt conflict have become pervasive. Frustrated scientists and
industrialists castigate the public forbehaviors they judgeto be based on
irrationality or ignorance. Members ofthe public feel similarly antagonistic
toward industry and government. Adesperate search for salvation through risk
communication efforts began inthe mid-1980s yet, despite some localized
successes, this effort has not stemmed the major conflicts orreduced much of
the dissatisfaction with risk management.
Early studies of risk perception demonstrated that the public's concerns
could not simply be blamed on ignorance or irrationality. Instead, research
showed that many of the public's reactions to riskcould be attributed to a
sensitivity to technical, social and psychological qualities of hazards thatwere
not well-modeled in technical risk assessments (e.g., qualities such as
uncertainty in risk assessments, perceived inequity in thedistribution of risks
and benefits, and aversionto being exposed to risks that were involuntary, not
underone's control, or dreaded). The important role of socialvalues in risk
perception and risk acceptance thus became apparent/0
More recently, another important aspect of the risk-perception problem
hascome to be recognized. This is therole of trust. In recent years there have
beennumerous articles and surveys pointing out the importance of trust in risk
management and documenting the extreme distrust we now have inmany ofthe
individuals, industries, and institutions responsible for risk management. This
pervasive distrust has also been shown to be strongly linked to risk perception
and to political activism to reduce risk.(26)
In this paper I shall look beyond current perceptions ofrisk and distrust
and attempt toexplain how they came to be this way. My explanation begins
with the idiosyncrasies of individual human minds, befitting my background as
a psychologist. However, individual psychology is not fully adequate to account
for risk perception and conflict. Abroader perspective is necessary, one that
includes the complex mix of scientific, social, political, legal, institutional, and
psychological factors operating within our society's risk-management system.
The Importance of Trust
Everyone knows intuitively that trust is important for all forms of
human social interaction. Perhaps because it is such a familiar concept, its
importance in risk management has not beenadequately appreciated. However,
numerous recent studies clearly point to lack of trust as a critical factor
underlying the divisive controversies that surround the management of
technological hazards.(7"21)
To appreciate the importance of trust, it is instructive to comparethose
risks that we fear and avoid withthose wecasually accept. Starr(22) has pointed
to the public's lack of concern aboutthe risks from tigers in urbanzoos as
evidence that acceptance of risks is strongly dependent uponconfidence in risk
management. Similarly, risk perception research(23) documents that people view
medical technologies based upon useof radiation and chemicals (i.e., x-rays and
prescription drugs) as high in benefit, low in risk, and clearly acceptable.
However, they viewindustrial technologies involving radiation andchemicals
(i.e., nuclear power, pesticides, industrial chemicals) as high in risk, lowin
benefit, andunacceptable. Although x-rays andmedicines posesignificant risks,
ourrelatively high degree of trust in thephysicians who manage these devices
makes them acceptable. Numerous polls have shown that thegovernment and
industry officials who oversee the management of nuclear power and
nonmedical chemicals are not highly trusted.(3,24,18,6)
Duringthe past several decades, the field of risk assessment has
developed to impart rationality to the management of technological hazards.
Risk assessment has its roots in epidemiology, toxicology, systems analysis,
reliability theory, andmany otherdisciplines. Probably more thanonebillion
dollars has been spentto conduct innumerable animal bioassays and
epidemiological studies to assess the human health consequences of exposure to
radiation and chemicals and to develop probabilistic risk analyses for nuclear
reactors, dams, hazardous wastetreatment, and otherengineered facilities. The
Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and
numerous othergovernment agencies havemade risk assessment the
centerpiece oftheir regulatory efforts.(2527)
It is now evident that publicperceptions and acceptance of risk from
nuclear and chemical technologies are not muchinfluenced by technical risk
assessments. Nowhere is this phenomenon more dramatically illustratedthan in
the unsuccessful struggle, across many years, to dispose of the accumulating
volume of spent fuel from the nation's commercial nuclear reactors. The
Department ofEnergy's program to establish a national repository has been
stymied by overwhelming public opposition, fueled by public perceptions that
the risks are immense and unacceptable.(6) These perceptions stand in stark
contrast to the prevailing view of the technical community, whose risk
assessments assert that nuclear wastes can be disposed of safely in an
underground repository (see Table I).
Insert Table I here
Public fears and opposition to nuclearwaste disposalplans can be seen
as a "crisis in confidence," a profound breakdown of trust in the scientific,
governmental, and industrial managers ofnuclear technologies. It is clear that
theDepartment ofEnergy and theU.S. Congress have notadequately
appreciated the importance of (dis)trust inthe failure of the nuclear waste
program, nor have they recognized the implications ofthis situation/6'21*
Analogous crises ofconfidence can bedemonstrated innumerous controversies
surrounding exposures to chemicals. Again, risk assessment, in these situations
based primarily upon toxicology, isoften impotent when it comes to resolving
conflict about chemical risks.(28)
Because it is impossible to exclude the public in ouruniquely
participatory democracy, the response ofindustry and government to this crisis
of confidence has been to turn to the young and still primitivefield of risk
communication in search of methods to bring experts and laypeople into
alignment and make conflicts over technological decisions easier to
resolve—see, e.g., William Ruckelshaus' stirring speeches on this topic,(26,29) the
National Academic ofSciences report on risk communication,00* and the
Chemical Manufacturer's Association communication manual for plant
managers/30 Although attention to communication can prevent blunders that
exacerbate conflict, there is rather little evidence that risk communication has
madeany significant contribution to reducing the gap between technical risk
assessments andpublic perceptions or to facilitating decisions about nuclear
waste or other major sources of risk conflict. The limited effectiveness of risk
communication efforts can be attributed to the lack of trust. If you trust the risk
manager, communication is relatively easy. If trust is lacking, no form or
process ofcommunication will be satisfactory/32* Thus trust is more
fundamental to conflict resolution than is risk communication.
Creation and Destruction of Trust
One of the most fundamental qualities of trust has been known for ages.
Trust is fragile. It is typically created rather slowly, but it can bedestroyed inan
instant—by a single mishap or mistake. Thus, once trust is lost, it may take a
long time to rebuild it to its former state. In some instances, lost trust may never
beregained. Abraham Lincoln understood this quality. Ina letter to Alexander
McClure he observed: "Ifyou onceforfeit the confidence of your fellow
citizens, you can never regain their respect and esteem" [italics added].
The asymmetry between the difficulty ofcreating trust and the ease of
destroying it has been studied by social psychologists within the domain of
interpersonal perception. For example, Rothbart and Park(33) had people rate 150
descriptive traits (adventurous, gentle, lazy, trustworthy, etc.) interms ofthe
number of relevant behavioral instancesnecessary to establish or disconfirm the
trait. Favorable traits (like trustworthiness) were judged to be hard to acquire
(many behavioral instances needed) and easy to lose. Unfavorable traits were
judged to be easier to acquire and harderto lose. The numberof behavioral
instances required to disconfirm a negative quality (e.g., dishonesty) was greater
than the number required to disconfirm a positivetrait. As Abraham Lincoln
might have predicted, trustworthiness stood out among the 150 traits as
requiring a relatively large number ofconfirming instances to establish thetrait
and a relatively smallnumber of relevant instances to disconfirm it. (Note that
data here werejudgmentsof the number of instances that wouldbe required as
opposed to data documenting thenumber of instances that actually confirmed or
disconfirmed a trait.)
The fact that trust is easier to destroy than to create reflects certain
fundamental mechanisms of human psychology that I shall call "the asymmetry
principle." When it comes to winning trust, the playing field is not level. It is
tilted toward distrust for each of the following reasons:
1. Negative (trust-destroying) events are more visible or noticeable than
positive (trust-building) events. Negative events often take the form ofspecific,
well-defined incidents such as accidents, lies, discoveries of enors or other
mismanagement. Positive events, while sometimes visible, more often are fuzzy
or indistinct. Forexample, how many positive events are represented by the safe
operation ofa nuclear power plant for one day? Is this one event? dozens of
events? hundreds? There is no precise answer. When events are invisible or
poorly defined, they carrylittle or no weight in shaping our attitudes and
opinions.
2. When events do come to our attention, negative (trust-destroying)
events carry much greaterweight than positiveevents. This important
psychological tendency is illustrated by a study in which mycolleagues andI
asked 103 college students to rate the impact on trust of 45 hypothetical news
events pertaining to the management of a large nuclear power plant in their
community/34* Some of these events were designed to be trustincreasing, such
as
• There have been no reported safetyproblems at the plant during the past year.
• There is careful selection and training of employees at the plant.
• Plant managers live nearby the plant.
• The county medical examiner reports thatthehealth of people living near the
plant is betterthan the average for the region.
Other events were designed to be trust decreasing, such as
• A potential safety problem was found tohave been covered upby plant
officials.
• Plant safety inspections are delayed in order to meet theelectricity production
quota for the month.
• A nuclear power plant in another state has a serious accident.
• The county medical examiner reports that the health ofpeople living near the
plant is worse than theaverage for the region.
Therespondents were asked to indicate, for eachevent, whether their
trust in the management of the plantwould be increased or decreased upon
learning of that event. After doing this, they rated how strongly their trust would
be affected bytheevent ona scale ranging from 1(very small impact on trust)
to 7 (very powerful impact ontrust). The percentages of Category 7 ratings,
shown inFigure 1, dramatically demonstrate that negative events are seen as far
more likely to have a powerful effect on trust than are positive events.
Insert Figure 1 here
The data shownin Table II are typical. The negativeevent, reporting
plant neighbors' health as worse than average, was rated 6 or7 on the impact
scale by 50.0 percent of the respondents. Amatched event, reporting
neighbors' health to be better than average, was rated 6or7 by only 18.3 per
cent of the respondents.
Insert Table II here
There was only one event perceived to have any substantial impact on
increasing trust. This event stated: "An advisory board of local citizens and
environmentalists is established to monitorthe plant and is given legal authority
to shut the plantdown if theybelieve it to be unsafe."
This strong delegation of authority to thelocal public was rated 6 or 7
on the impact scale by 38.4 per cent ofthe respondents. Although this was a far
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stronger showing than for any other positive event, it would have been a rather
average performance in the distribution of impacts fornegative events.
The reasons for the greaterimpactof trust-destroying incidents are
complex and I shall not discuss them here except to note that the importance of
an event is at least in part related to its frequency (orrarity). Anaccident in a
nuclear plant is more informative with regard to risk, than is a day (oreven a
large number of days) without anaccident. Thus, in systems where we are
concerned about low-probability/high consequence events, problematic events
will increase our perceptions ofrisk to a much greater degree than favorable
events will decrease them.
3. Adding fuel to the fire ofasymmetry isyet another idiosyncracy of
human psychology—sources ofbad (trust-destroying) news tend to be seen as
more credible than sources of good news. Forexample, in several studies of
whatwe call "intuitive toxicology,"(35) we have examined people's confidence
inthe ability ofanimal studies topredict human health effects from chemicals.
In general, confidence in the validity ofanimal studies is not particularly high.
However, when told that a study has found that a chemical is carcinogenic in
animals, people express considerable confidence in the validity ofthis study for
predicting health effects in humans. Regulators respond like the public. Positive
(bad news) evidence from animal bioassays is presumptive evidence ofrisk to
humans; negative evidence (e.g., the chemical was not found to be harmful)
carries littleweight/36*
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4. Another important psychological tendency is that distrust, once
initiated, tends to reinforce and perpetuate distrust. This occurs in two ways.
First, distrust tends to inhibit the kinds of personal contacts and experiences that
are necessary to overcome distrust. By avoiding others whose motives or
actions we distrust, we never get to see that these peopleare competent, well-
meaning, and trustworthy. Second, initial trust or distrust colorsour
interpretation of events, thus reinforcing our prior beliefs. Persons who trusted
thenuclear power industry saw theevents at Three Mile Island as demonstrating
the soundness of the "defense in depth" principle, noting that the multiple safety
systems shut the plant down and contained most of itsradiation. Persons who
distrusted nuclear power prior to theaccident took an entirely different message
from the same events, perceiving thatthose in charge didnotunderstand what
was wrong orhow to fix it and that catastrophe was averted only bysheer luck.
"The System Destroys Trust"
Thus far I have been discussing the psychological tendencies that create
and reinforce distrust in situations of risk. Appreciation of those psychological
principles leads us toward a new perspective on risk perception, trust, and
conflict. Conflicts and controversies surrounding risk management are not due
to public inationality orignorance but, instead, can be seen as expected side
effects ofthese psychological tendencies, interacting with our remarkable form
ofparticipatory Democratic government, and amplified by certain powerful
technological and social changes inour society. The technological change has
12
given the electronic andprintmedia the capability (effectively utilized) of
informing us of news from all over the world—often right as it happens.
Moreover, just as individuals give greater weight and attention to negative
events, so do the news media. Muchof what the media reports is bad (trust-
destroying) news/37* This is convincingly demonstrated by Koren and Klein,(38)
who compared therates ofnewspaper reporting of two studies, one providing
bad news and one good news, published backto back in the March 20, 1991
issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association. Both studies
examinedthe link betweenradiation exposure and cancer. The bad news study
showed an increased risk to leukemia in white men working at the Oak Risk
National Laboratory. The good news study failed to show anincreased risk of
cancer inpeople residing near nuclear facilities. Koren and Klein found that
subsequent newspaper coverage was far greater for the study showing increased
risk.
The second important change, a social phenomenon, is the riseof
powerful special interest groups—well funded (by a fearful public) and
sophisticated in using their own experts and the media to communicate their
concerns and their distrustto the public in orderto influence risk policydebates
anddecisions/39* The social problem is compounded by the fact thatwetend to
manage our risks within anadversarial legal system that pits expert vs. expert,
contradicting each other's risk assessments and further destroying the public
trust.
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The youngscience of risk assessment is too fragile, too indirect to
prevail in such a hostileatmosphere. Scientific analysis of risks cannotallay our
fears of low-probability catastrophes or delayed cancers unless we trust the
system. In theabsence of trust, science (and risk assessment) canonly feed
distrust, by uncovering more badnews. A single study demonstrating an
association between exposure to chemicals or radiation and someadverse health
effectcannoteasilybe offsetby numerous studies failing to find suchan
association. Thus, for example, the more studies that are conducted looking for
effects of electric and magnetic fields or otherdifficult to evaluate hazards, the
more likely it is that these studies will increase public concerns, even if the
majority ofthese studies fail to find any association with ill health/40"41* In
short, risk-assessment studies tend to increase perceived risk.
Where Next? Risk and Democracy
Although the study of riskperception and trust hasnotyet ledto a
solutionto our risk-management problems, it appears to be leading to a more
adequate diagnosis ofthe root causes of risk concerns and risk conflicts. As we
begin to understand the complexity ofrisk conflicts, we recognize the need for
new approaches to risk management. The road branches intwo very different
directions/42* One direction leads towards less public participation and more
centralized control. One might call this the French model. France leads the
world inthe percentage ofelectricity generated by nuclear power (73 per cent in
1991, compared to 21 per cent for the U.S.). France, like the U.S., was rocked
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by strong anti-nuclear protests during the late 1970s but the state acted
forcefully to repress theseprotests and the anti-nuclear movement nevergained
favor with thepolitical parties in power. Today, surprisingly, theperception of
risk from nuclear power remains extremely highin France—as highas in the
U.S., according to national surveys mycolleagues and I recently conducted in
both countries. However, French citizens, while recognizing that they have little
control over risks to their health and safety, have a high degree of trust in their
government and inthe experts who design and operate nuclear power plants.
Americans, in contrast, combine their similarly high degree of perceived risk
with a distrust of government, science, and industry anda beliefthat they do
have some ability to control risks. In fact, the American system does provide
individual citizens and citizen groups considerable freedom to intervene in
administrative proceedings, to question expert judgments of government
agencies, and to force changes in policy through litigation/43*
Political scientists have recognized that, in a climateof strong distrust,
the French approach, inwhich policy formation and implementation is not
accessible to public intervention, is expedient/44* Campbell/45* for example,
argues that formal democratic institutions providing political access to nuclear
critics may be fundamentally incompatible with commercial success ofnuclear
power.
Whatworks in France, however, is unlikely to be achievable in the U.S.
The French nuclear power program is run bythe state, not private industry.
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Electricite de Francehas long had a strongreputation for being competentand
putting service above profits. The French have a tradition of looking to a
scientific elite for guidance inpolicy matters. Jasper,(46) noting that the word as
well as the image of a "technocrat" arose in France, observed that "Perhaps no
other political system provides as large a role for people to exercise power on
thebasis of technical training and certification."(46, p83)
America, since Thomas Jefferson, has had a differentapproachto
democracy and it is not surprising that attempts to restrict citizens' rights to
intervene directly in national risk-management policies have been vigorously
opposed. Arecent example isthe unsuccessful attempt inCongress to strip the
stateof Nevada of its rights to issue environmental and safety permits for
nuclear waste studies at Yucca Mountain/47*
Given that the French approach is not likely to be acceptable in the U.S.,
restoration of trust may require a degree of openness and involvement with the
public that goes far beyond public relations and "two-way communication" to
encompass levels ofpower sharing and public participation indecision making
and that have rarely been attempted/48"50* Even this, however, is no guarantee of
success/51"52* Inmany situations, we may have to recognize that relationships
are so poisoned that trust and conflict resolution cannot realistically be achieved
in the short run. The bitter conflict over the proposed nuclear wasterepository
inNevada isa prime example ofsuch a situation. To preserve the form of
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democracy we value so highly, we will need to develop ways to work
constructively in situations where we cannot assume that trust is attainable/15*
We have a long way to go in improving our risk-management processes.
Although we have expended massive amounts of time, money, and resources on
scientific studies designed to identify and quantify risks, we have failed to
expend the effort needed to learn how to manage the hazards that science is so
good at identifying. Gerald Jacob(53) frames the challenge well inthe context of
nuclear waste disposal, and his words are also relevant to many other risk
problems:
While everyone canappreciate thata complex, highly sophisticated
engineering is required to safely store nuclear materials for thousands of
years, fewhave appreciated the political requirements necessary to
design and implement such a solution. While vast resources have been
expended ondeveloping complex and sophisticated technologies, the
equally sophisticated political processes and institutions required to
develop a credible and legitimate strategy for nuclear waste management
have not beendeveloped. The history of high-level radioactive waste
management describes repeated failure to recognize theneed for
institutional reform and reconstruction/53, p 164)
Some may view the analysis inthis paper as a depressing one. I do not.
Understanding the root causes ofsocial conflict and recognizing the need to
create better risk-management processes are essential first steps toward
17
improving the situation. It is far more depressing, inmyview, to fail to
understand the complex psychological, social, cultural, andpolitical forces that
dictate the successes and failures of risk management.
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Table I. Viewpoints on the risks from nuclear waste disposal.
The following comments reflect expert viewpoints on the risks from nuclear waste disposal and
the public's perceptions of these risks.
"Several years ago... I talked with Sir John Hill, .. .chairman of the United Kingdom's
Atomic Energy Authority. 'I've never come across any industry where the public perception of
the problem is so totally different from the problems as seen by those of us in the industry . ..,'
Hill told me. In Hill's view, the problem of radioactive waste disposal was, in a technical sense,
comparatively easy." (L. J. Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust. Resources for the
Future, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1987, p. 9.)
"Nuclear wastes can be sequestered with essentially no chance of any member of the
public receiving a non-stochastic dose of radiation. ... Why is the public's perception of the
nuclear waste issue at such odds with the experts' perception?" (A.M. Weinberg, Public
Perceptions of Hazardous Technologiesand DemocraticPolitical Institutions. Paper presented
at Waste Management 1989, Tucson, Arizona, 1989, pp. 1-2.)
"The fourth major reason for public misunderstanding of nuclear power is a grossly
unjustified fear of the hazards from radioactive waste ... there is general agreement among
those scientists involved with waste management that radioactive waste disposal is a rather
trivial technical problem." (B. L. Cohen, Before It's Too Late: A Scientist's Case for Nuclear
Energy. Plenum, New York, 1983, p. 119.)
"The risk is as negligible as it is possible to imagine ... It is embarrassingly easy to solve
the technical problems, yet impossibleto solve the political ones." (H.W. Lewis, Technological
Risk. W. W. Norton, New York, 1990, pp. 245-246).
Table II. Judged Impact of a Trust-Increasing Event and a Similar Trust-
Decreasing Event.
Impact on Trust
very
small
1 2 3 4 5 6
very
powerful
7 .
Trust-Increasing Event
The county medical examiner
reports that the health of people
living near the plant is better
than average.
21.5 14.0 10.8 18.3 17.2 16.1 2.2
Trust-Decreasing Event
The county medical examiner
reports that the health of people
living near the plant is worse
than average.
3.0 8.0 2.0 16.0 21.0 26.0 24.0
Note: Cell entries indicate the percentage of respondents in each impact rating category.
Local board authority to close plant
Evacuation plan exists
On-site government inspector
Rewarded for finding problems
Responsive to any sign of problems
Effective emergency action taken
Local advisory board established
Public encouraged to tour plant
Mandatory drug testing
No problems for five years
Hold regular public hearings
Employees carefully trained
Conduct emergency training
Community has access to records
Serious accident is controlled
Health nearby is better than average
Monitor radioactive emissions
Employees informed of problems
Neighbors notified of problems
No evidence of withholding information
Contribute to local charities
Employees closely supervised
Try to meet with public
Managers live nearby
Operates according to regulations
No problems in past year
Record keeping is good
Trust
Decreasing
20% 40%
Trust
Increasing
60%
Don't contribute to local charities
No public hearings
Little communication with community
Emergency response plans not rehearsed
Officials live far away
Poor record keeping
Accident occurs in another state
Accused of releasing radiation
Denied access to records
Employees not informed of problems
Delayed inspections
Public tours not permitted
Health nearby worse than average
Official lied to government
Serious accident is controlled
No adequate emergency response plan
Plant covered up problem
Employees drunk on job
Records were falsified
-60% -40% -20% 0%
Percent Very Powerful Impact
Category 7 ratings only
Figure 1. Differential impact oftrust-increasing and trust-decreasing events.
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